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Article 6

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING CRIMINAL LAW: CURING THE DISCONNECT

NEIL P. COHEN*
Teaching Criminal Law1 is like teaching religion: there are so many
varieties of it, each strongly endorsed by at least one person to whom it makes
at least some internal sense. The result is a lack of agreement about what the
course is all about and few external standards to assess whether the course is
accomplishing its goals. The problem is sorting out the core of the course.
This involves answering the question, “What should be taught in the ordinary
first-year Criminal Law course?” The issue is complex and subject to widely
different answers. Of course the answer often depends on the personal values
of the person answering the question. But it is often forgotten that the answer
should also depend on the conceptual framework for legal education at the law
school. Criminal Law should be seen as both a unique and important subject
as well as part of a larger integrated curriculum with articulated goals and
complementary components.
To some, Criminal Law should place far more emphasis on race,2 gender,3
domestic violence,4 justice, legal history, poverty, philosophy, legal ethics,5

* Distinguished Service Professor of Law, the University of Tennessee College of Law.
1. I am referring to the substantive Criminal Law course that carries three or four hours of
academic credit and is usually part of the first-year law curriculum.
2. See, e.g., Jodie-Marie Masley, Testimony of Chrystal Blossom James, 12 BERKELEY LA
RAZA L.J. 433 (2001) (suggesting that a criminal law professor should have explored the race
implications of a class hypothetical).
3. See, e.g., Kristin Bebelaar et al., Domestic Violence in Legal Education and Legal
Practice: A Dialogue Between Professors and Practitioners, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 409 (2003). The
article notes that an obvious place for this discussion is with the battered woman’s defense. Other
illustrative areas for gender-based analysis include the concept of reasonableness, omissions
where parents are charged with child neglect, and provocation. See also Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Mainstreaming Feminism in Legal Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 199, 207-08
(2003) (recommending the coverage of feminist issues throughout the curriculum, even in the
basic Criminal Law course, including issues exploring whether women should be subject to the
death penalty when they have not been fully represented in the formulation of death penalty laws
and procedures).
An interesting variation of this approach occurred in a seminar where upper-class law
students enrolled in a course entitled “A Feminist Revisit to the First-Year Curriculum.” The
course examined the feminist issues that were presented by subjects covered in the various firstyear offerings. Anita Bernstein, A Feminist Revisit to the First-Year Curriculum, 46 J. LEGAL
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and a host of other relevant considerations, sometimes broadly characterized as
the social context of the law.6 Some even argue that there should be
substantial coverage of a particular crime, such as prostitution,7 that reflects
particular issues.
Others think that law classes should deal more with the skills that lawyers
need to practice law. This could include such skills as mediation, negotiation,
fact investigation, “thinking like a lawyer,” interviewing, and trial practice. It
has also been suggested that law school classes should focus more on the client
and the client’s perspective.8 Yet other faculty members believe that law
school should be “above trade” and view the inadequacy of skills training as a
virtue.9
Resolving these sometimes conflicting course objectives might be
impossible in the time-crunched first-year Criminal Law course. Everyone
would agree that not all of the above topics could be covered, even poorly, in a
three hour Criminal Law offering that also deals with the more traditional
facets of the subject. This means that the criminal law instructor must make
some hard choices that could engender serious challenge by people with
different values and priorities.
The matter is made more complex because the instructor’s choices are
solidly protected by the important doctrine of academic freedom. Whatever
path the professor takes—such as including or not including much attention to
race, gender, poverty, sociology, history or philosophy, or any number of
skills—will likely be respected by a faculty and administration uninterested in
interfering with an instructor’s decisions about his or her course coverage and
focus.
In addition, the query about the content of the Criminal Law course raises
broad questions that a faculty does not address in any systematic way or even
give its members much guidance in resolving. Courses are viewed as the
province of the instructor rather than as a constituent element of a larger
conceptual entity. For inexplicable reasons, legal education is viewed as a
EDUC. 217 (1996). In revisiting Criminal Law, the students discussed the gender issues raised by
the sentencing of Leona Helmsley. Id. at 221-22.
4. See, e.g., Bebelaar, supra note 3, at 419 (“There has always been an obvious relationship
between intimate and family violence and criminal law, so it should be inevitable that these topics
pervade that course.”).
5. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal
Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1547, 1561 (1993) [hereinafter Rhode, Missing Questions];
Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31 (1992).
6. See Rhode, Missing Questions, supra note 5, at 1558.
7. See, e.g., Beverly Balos, Teaching Prostitution Seriously, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 709
(2001).
8. See Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1731, 1731-33 (1993).
9. See Rhode, Missing Questions, supra note 5, at 1555.
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series of component parts that eventually comprise a whole. To some, the end
result, irrespective of how it got that way, is a spectacular educational
experience. To others, of course, the whole is less than the sum of the parts.
The result of these conflicting views of course content, the faculty’s
unwillingness to conceptualize legal education as an integrated whole, and the
individual faculty member’s independence engendered by the concept of
academic freedom, is that each faculty member is rather free to structure the
basic Criminal Law course with little direction from the administration or
colleagues.
Many of us who teach Criminal Law resolve the issue by trying to cut the
baby in half. In our first-year Criminal Law course, we deal with many of
these issues, though none well or in any depth. Lip service replaces serious
analysis. We might say we “cover” race and gender and skill issues, but in
truth we give our students grossly inadequate background materials that almost
trivialize very important matters affected by the criminal law. According to
one observer:
Nor do conventional approaches adequately situate formal doctrine in social or
historical context. The level of abstraction in most classrooms is both too
theoretical and not theoretical enough; it neither probes the underlying
foundations of legal doctrine nor offers practical assistance about how to use
that doctrine in particular cases.10

I. A PERSONAL SHORT STORY
I have taught the first-year Criminal Law course for many years. I
occasionally served as a criminal defense lawyer during that time. The
Criminal Law course I taught dealt with the traditional subjects, including such
esoterica as impossible attempts and criminalization—what should be made
criminal. Because of time constraints, the course often omitted coverage of
crimes that people who actually handle criminal cases must understand, such
as theft, assault, robbery, and burglary. It also omitted any in-depth coverage
of sometimes dispositive issues like burden of proof, fact and statutory
interpretation, and the persuasive background of the guilty plea.
A few years ago, I was afforded the chance to leave teaching for a short
period and become an assistant district attorney11 prosecuting state cases in a

10. Id. at 1558.
11. The opportunity itself is worth noting and merits serious consideration by many
academics. At the suggestion of a member of the local district attorney general’s office, I
arranged to swap jobs with an experienced district attorney general. For one semester, he moved
into my law school office and taught full-time. I moved into his office and handled criminal
cases. All administrative matters were unchanged. Each of us continued to be paid by our
original employers. Thus, there was no problem with such matters as retirement and insurance.
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medium-sized county. I did so full-time for five months and then part-time for
several more years. The experience was phenomenal. I learned so much about
the workings of the criminal justice system, including plea bargains, discovery,
and the grand jury.
Both during and after this experience, I reflected a lot about the basic
Criminal Law course that I had taught many times. During my relatively brief
tenure as a prosecutor, I came to realize that many important issues routinely
faced by lawyers in criminal law are simply ignored or given short shrift in the
basic Criminal Law course and are not systematically taught in any other
offering. For example, I did not encounter any impossible attempt cases, but I
did see a significant number of assault-related incidents. And every single day
I spent a significant amount of time reading statutes and case files, and trying
to assess how, or whether, the facts I thought I could prove would enable me to
establish the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. CORE ISSUES IN CRIMINAL LAW COURSE
It seems to me that a basic Criminal Law course should encompass at least
three general goals. Currently, American Criminal Law courses routinely
cover some of these matters and virtually ignore others.
A.

Universal Constructs

First, the basic American Criminal Law course should educate law students
about a number of universal theoretical constructs that are the basis for
criminal law. These include such concepts as responsibility (and defenses),
intentionality, mens rea, actus reus, causation, punishment, harm, and inchoate
offenses.
B.

Structure of the Criminal Law and the Criminal Justice System

Second, and often overlapping with the first goal, it should teach the
general structure of American substantive criminal law. This embraces such
traditional topics as burden of proof, vagueness, accomplice liability,
codification,12 and the basic structure of a modern criminal code, such as the
The only administrative matter concerned, of course, parking. We exchanged parking spaces, but
had to make a financial adjustment because one of our parking spaces cost more than the other.
12. The treatment of statutes in existing Criminal Law course materials is interesting in its
variety. Every casebook discusses the rise of statutes in criminal law. The materials are
presented ordinarily in the context of the principle of legality and vagueness. Professor Dressler,
for example, has written a well-regarded criminal law course book that devotes a whole chapter to
the “Modern Role of Criminal Statutes.” JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CRIMINAL LAW 85-120 (3d ed. 2003). The chapter includes five substantial cases and some
notes. The cases focus on the principle of legality, the values of statutory clarity, and statutory
interpretation, but do not require students to read and interpret statutes without the judicial sifting
that occurs in the given appellate decisions. The chapter also does not teach much about the
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Model Penal Code. It also should encompass the general structure of the
criminal justice system, including the roles of the various actors such as the
police, courts, prosecutors, legislators, and defense lawyers. Additionally,
there should be an introduction to fundamental societal issues, such as race and
gender in the context of criminal law.
C. Skills
Third, the course should contribute to first-year law students’ acquisition
of important skills,13 especially ones that lawyers need in criminal cases and

interpretation of statutes other than through one case that does discuss a few approaches to
statutory interpretation in criminal cases—especially strict construction. There are no problems
that require students to read and parse statutes without the benefit of an appellate bench’s
coaching. If this is the only training students get in statutory interpretation, their education is
lacking in a most important way. It should be noted, of course, that Professor Dressler does not
deserve criticism because he has not chosen to address statutory interpretation in more than a
perfunctory way. His choice of materials and approach simply reflects a value structure that
assumes students get instruction about statutes in other courses.
Professor LaFave, on the other hand, deals more directly with statutory interpretation,
including processes of both judicial and administrative bodies. He even devotes a few pages to
some canons of statutory interpretation. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW:
CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 53-54 (3d ed. 2001).
Many other criminal law course books do no more than hint at the role of statutes in
modern criminal law. Often this occurs in the mandatory discussion of vagueness and the
principle of legality. See, e.g., RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 35-57 (1997). This
book contains an interesting potential statutory exercise when it discusses a statute defining
obscenity. Id. at 59. See also LLOYD L. WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENT,
QUESTIONS 740-42 (7th ed. 2003); PHILLIP E. JOHNSON & MORGAN CLOUD, CRIMINAL LAW:
CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 69-73 (7th ed. 2002) (includes a brief discussion of the role of
criminal statutes in the context of introducing the Model Penal Code).
Another approach is to deal rather heavily with statutes by intensively using the Model
Penal Code’s provisions to illustrate various issues. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., CRIMINAL
LAW: CASES, MATERIALS & PROBLEMS (2002) (presenting students with many provisions of the
Model Penal Code, including some spanning several pages, which should provide first-year law
students valuable exposure to criminal statutes and helpful experience reading and understanding
them).
13. It is obvious that I find that much of the approach espoused by the MacCrate Report is
worth very serious consideration by law schools. See LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW
SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992). More particularly, I agree with
MacCrate’s observation:
I suggest that [the MacRate Report] challenges all law teachers, whatever their scholarly
interests or pedagogical bent, to look beyond their own compartments of scholarship and
teaching, to escape the confines separating doctrinal learning from skills and values
instruction, and to identify the role they choose to play in the preparation of lawyers along
the educational continuum of that profession of which all who work in the law are
members.
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that are well-suited for inclusion in the basic Criminal Law course. Obviously
students must acquire solid legal-reasoning skills. Often this is taught through
the case method where case after case is parsed in a Socratic style dialogue.14
Another skill the case method teaches is case analysis—the ability to read,
understand, critique, and manipulate, mostly appellate, judicial decisions. The
problem is that the same case analysis skills are surely covered in many other
first-year courses, such as Contracts, Torts, and often Constitutional Law.
Students learn how to read, analyze, and apply judicial decisions in these
courses. It is reasonable to suggest that the other first-year courses might
provide sufficient, if not too much, attention to this skill, releasing Criminal
Law from the rather substantial burden of teaching case analysis and freeing it
to focus on skills not necessarily covered elsewhere in the first-year
curriculum.
Another skill—the ability to understand and apply statutes—however,
frequently is given short shrift in the first-year Criminal Law course despite its
paramount importance to modern law in general15 and criminal law in
particular. Indeed, there may well be law students who finish their first year of
law school without having been presented with many statutes. More tragically,
many law students complete their legal education without much organized
instruction in dealing with statutes, despite the predominant role of this form of
law. This unfortunate lacuna is of significant concern for the student who will
handle criminal cases. The modern truth is that criminal law today is statutory
law. Anyone who practices criminal law must be able to read, understand, and
apply statutes, some of which are complex and poorly written.16 This fact
Robert MacCrate, Preparing Lawyers to Participate Effectively in the Legal Profession, 44 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 89, 89 (1994).
14. A former colleague, who was a strong critic of the so-called Socratic method of legal
education, once observed that if Socrates actually saw the teaching technique that bears his name
he would voluntarily take hemlock.
15. For an articulate argument about the role of statutes in modern law and the many
advantages of teaching law students about statutes, see Jack Stark, Teaching Statutory Law, 44 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 579 (1994). See also H. Miles Foy, III, Legislation and Pedagogy in Contracts
101, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1273, 1274 (2000) (“[T]he established forms [of teaching contract law]
do not deal adequately with legislation, the most important legal phenomenon of the modern
era.”).
Teaching about statutes, whether or not in the Criminal Law class, should assist students
in understanding both the process by which statutes are written by legislatures and interpreted by
courts, as well as the structure of statutes—especially lengthy complicated ones. One useful
instructional tool is to have students actually write or rewrite all or part of a statute, and then have
the students’ efforts critiqued by other students, perhaps serving as advocates for opposite sides
or as judges faced with applying the students’ work. This exercise provides students with terrific
insight into statutes and the legislative process.
16. A similar argument has been made with regard to Contracts. See Foy, supra note 15, at
1274 (recommending that the first-year Contracts course devote more attention to statutes and
their interpretation).
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alone justifies using the Criminal Law course to teach statutory analysis to
first-year students.17
Another important skill, often given short shrift in the first-year law
curriculum, is the ability to assess, marshal, and “manipulate” facts. In the
context of criminal cases, it includes understanding how critical facts are in
criminal cases and how ambiguous they may well be. It also includes a basic
understanding of the processes used in criminal cases to present facts and to
resolve the facts to be applied to the law.
Finally, criminal law students need to understand how the facts and law
interact in an adversary context in criminal cases. This requires students to
understand the applicable law, including its many ambiguities, and how facts
are used to support the position of the government or the defendant. They also
should begin the process of learning how to marshal the facts as an adversary
would.
III. A REPORT CARD
The basic Criminal Law course and the materials used to teach the course
are somewhat well-equipped to satisfy the first goal, teaching students the
fundamental theoretical constructs that shape American criminal law. The
course is less successful in teaching the basic structure of the criminal law.
Unfortunately, the criminal law is viewed piecemeal with little opportunity for
students to reflect on the whole. Thus, each defense is studied, but too often
the concept of defenses is given short shrift and virtually no effort is made to
compare defenses. Moreover, the overall structure of a criminal code is
ignored, as the focus is on individual components but not on the
interrelationship of the various pieces.
One of the biggest weaknesses, however, is in the area of skills. Many of
us do not see the Criminal Law class as the proper place to teach skills.
Rather, we focus on theory, leaving to others, such as Criminal Procedure and
trial practice courses, the daunting task of teaching skills. This decision, to
some extent prompted by enormous time pressures in a three-hour course,
might well shortchange the student’s legal education.
IV. A MODEST SUGGESTION
I suggest that law faculty who teach in the criminal law area reconsider
what they teach in this basic course. More particularly, they should assess
what skills they try to teach. Of course, any effort to increase the skills being
taught in the Criminal Law course may well be hampered by the paucity of

17. Another approach is a freestanding course on legislation as an addition to an individual
course’s attention to statutes when appropriate, such as tax or criminal law. See generally Stark,
supra note 15.
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available materials that facilitate skills teaching.18 What is needed is a new set
of materials that specifically addresses statutes and facts in the adversarial
context in which criminal law operates.
A wonderful vehicle would be the use of problems that require the students
to understand criminal statutes and apply them as an adversary to a set of facts.
This approach, already championed by others,19 would force students to deal
directly with statutes as a primary source of law. To apply the statutes, the
student would have to read them carefully and understand what is in the statute
and what is omitted or possibly covered in an ambiguous manner. In applying
the statute to a set of facts, the student would have to figure out what are the
elements of the statute and how the facts might or might not assist in the proof
of those elements. Unlike the case method, where an appellate court identifies
the relevant portions of the statute, the student would have to make this
determination without the benefit of the thoughts of an appellate judge.
It should be stressed that giving more attention to skills does not
necessarily mean that other issues must be given short shrift. Skills training
can be combined with other important issues. For example, assume that a
criminal law professor wants to include statutory analysis, fact assessment and
argumentation, and considerations of race and gender in a portion of a
Criminal Law course. Perhaps the instructor would use a problem with a fact
situation and a statute that contained a mental element using an objective
reasonableness standard. The students could carefully parse the statute, then
apply the facts to the statute, perhaps in an adversarial role-playing situation.
During the process students could discuss how the concept of reasonableness
might be based on assumptions that involve racial or gender stereotypes but
give too little attention to differences in perceptions based on race or gender.
This could lead to a discussion of the role of certain fundamental values in
criminal law.
The bottom line is that those of us who teach the basic Criminal Law
course should give some time to reconsidering two issues. First, how does
what we do relate to the other parts of the law curriculum, especially the firstyear offerings? Do we complement the other courses so that our students end
the year or their three years with the skills and knowledge we want them to
have? Second, how does our course relate to the skills needed by someone

18. See, e.g., Bebelaar, supra note 3, at 424 (noting that a survey of criminal law teachers
concluded that certain subjects were not taught in the course because the teaching materials did
not include the topic).
19. For a powerful argument in favor of the problem method, see Myron Moskovitz, Beyond
the Case Method: It’s Time to Teach with Problems, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 241 (1992). Professor
Moskovitz has authored a criminal law course book that uses many creative problems (plus cases
and commentary, of course) in the basic Criminal Law course. See MYRON MOSKOVITZ, CASES
AND PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL LAW (5th ed. 2003).
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involved in criminal cases? The answers might suggest that perhaps new
approaches merit serious consideration.
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